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RECENT CASE NOTES
ment or board of the municipality is acting. Orvis v. Park Com'rs, 88 Iowa
674, 56 N. W. 294.
The liberal construction of similar limitations in other jurisdictions has
led to such burdens upon property as to make the provisions of little or no
utility. The discussion of Justice McCabe seems to be one possible solution, "The court of equity may look through and disregard mere forms to
substance of things. If it were not so the legislature may in every instance evade the 13th article of the Constitution and make it practically
a dead letter. To accomplish that result, whenever it deems it desirable
that a municipality or political corporation should become indebted beyond
the limit prescribed in the article, all that would be necessary to do so,
would be enact a statute authorizing a board of commissioners to issue and
sell bonds in the name of the county and levy a tax upon the property
within the municipal corporation to pay the bonds." Board of Com'rs v.
Reeves, 148 Ind. 467, 475. Another possible solution is to pass another
amendment limiting the aggregate indebtedness of all corporations within
the same territory as is provided in the South Carolina Constitution, Art.
10, Sec. 5.
R. R. D.
SEARCH AND SEIZURE WITHOUT WARRANT - INTOXICATING LIQUORTIMELY OBJECTION.-Officers having information that intoxicating liquor
was to be delivered at a certain place, stationed themselves there. The
defendant with three companions stopped the car he was driving at this
place. As the four men alighted from the coupe, the officers confronted
them with pistols. The defendant fled, was fired at several times, but
escaped. The officers arrested his three companions, seized the car, broke
the lock on it and found intoxicating liquor. Said officers had no warrant
of any kind. Defendant was subsequently arrested, and at his trial for
transporting intoxicating liquor, held some eleven months later, he objected
to introduction of the officers' testimony as to the results of the search, no
motion to quash such evidence having been filed. Objections overruled,
defendant appealed. Held, reversed, new trial ordered, search being based
on mere suspicion was illegal, and evidence was thus wrongfully introducd. (Martin, J., dissenting.) Karlen v. State, Supreme Court of Indiana,
December 31, 1930, 174 N. E. 89.
'It is well established that an officer may make an arrest or conduct a
search and seizure without a warrant on reasonable and probable cause
for believing the person arrested or whose property is searched is committing or has committed a felony. Koseielski v. State, 199 Ind. 546, 158
N. E. 902; De Long v. State, 201 Ind. 302, 168 N. E. 22; Long v. State,
89 Ind. App. 496; 167 N. E. 140; Murphy v. State, 197 Ind. 360, 151 N. E.
97; Boyd v. State, 198 Ind. 55, 152 N. E. 278; 4 Ind. Law J. 311.
The United States Supreme Court stated the rule thus: "On reason and
authority the true rule is that if the search and seizure without a warrant
are made upon probable cause, that is, upon a belief, reasonably arising
out of circumstances known to the seizing officer, that an automobile or
other vehicle contains that which by law is subject to seizure and destruction, the search and seizure are valid." Carrollv. United States (1923),
267 U. S. 132, 45 S. Ct. 280, 69 L. Ed. 543, 39 A. L. R. 790. The application of this rule is often, however, exceedingly complicated.
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Suspicion alone does not give probable cause. Edwards v. State,
152 N. E. 721; Doncaster v. State, 151 N. E. 724; Hart v. State, 145 N. E.
492; Robinson v. State, 197 Ind. 144, 149 N. E. 891. But previous information plus suspicious actions on the part of the parties searched have often
been held to constitute probable cause, as the following cases will show.
In Long v. State, supra, it was held that a sheriff receiving a report
that defendant was hauling liquor in a described auto, was justified in
arresting him on his admitting ownership of the described car.
In Hanger v. State, 199 Ind. 727, 160 N. E. 449, a sheriff had received
information by telephone from one who saw defendant loading jugs into
his auto that "those cars are in at R's again." On approaching the place
where the officers were waiting on the highway for him, the defendant
abandoned his car, and fled until overtaken and arrested. It was held that
there was sufficient cause for search and arrest without a warrant. The
dissenting judge in the principal case in writing the opinion of Hanger v.
State, said, "If an officer, from the exercise of his own sense, coupled with
information from sources so reliable that a prudent and careful person,
having due regard for the rights of others, would act thereon, has reasonable and probable cause to believe that the offense of unlawful transportation of intoxicating liquor in an automobile is being committed in his presence, and he has no opportunity to obtain a warrant, he may search and
seize the auto, which is believed to be carrying such contraband liquor."
Faut v. State, 201 Ind. 322, 168 N. E. 124, held that an anonymous telephone call to officers that a described automobile tank car was transporting
intoxicating liquor was insufficient ground for searching such automobile.
But when the officers, acting on such information, found. a tank wagon without the usual oil faucets, bearing no lettering indicating the name of its
owners, and having only one foreign license plate, said truck stopping
only after repeated demands, they were held to have sufficient reasons to
search the tank without a warrant. This opinion was also written by the
judge who dissented in the principal case.
In Hinds v. State, 170 N. E. 539, officers had information from chief of
police that someone in a car bearing a license number from the southern
part of the state would be through their city with liquor. They saw a car
bearing such license as to show that the car was from the southern part of
Indiana and when they approached it saw a jug partly uncovered and also
smelled intoxicating liquor. Reasonable and probable cause was correctly
found.
In the absence of any information at all from outside sources, various
acts of the parties or attending circumstances of comparatively slight
nature have been held to constitute probable cause in many cases. In
Greer v. State, 201 Ind. 386, 168 N. E. 581, the defendant abandoned his
automobile and fled upon approach of officers. The latter smelled whisky
in the car, and were held to have reasonable and probable cause to believe
the defendant was engaged in transporting liquor. In Burnett v. State, 155
N. E. 209, an officer seeing defendants in possession of a truck loaded with
tin cans, and smelling the odor of liquor emanating therefrom was held
justified in making an arrest without a warrant.
These cases have been thus outlined to reveal the fact that there is a
very close question of fact presented in the principal case as to whether
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probable cause existed. They also show that one judge has consistently
found probable cause where others have failed.
The Indiana cases that previously have failed to find probable cause
under similar circumstances seem on the whole much farther from the line
than the case in question. In Batts v. State, 194 Ind. 609, 144 N. E. 23, a
sheriff and his deputies stationed themselves on a highway and stopped and
searched passing machines without discrimination. They signalled to the
defendant to stop, but he turned around and drove rapidly in the other
direction until bullets fired by deputies stopped his car. A search followed.
The sheriff admitted he had no warrants for anyone, and had not suspected
the defendant or had seen any violation of the law by him. The defendant
declared that he believed himself confronted by robbers. The search was
held to be unreasonable, and the case is now often cited for the proposition
that flight alone is insufficient to create probable cause. The entire set of
facts, however, rather limits the force of the case on this proposition.
Eiler v. State, 196 Ind. 562, 149 N. E. 62, was clearly a case of mere
suspicion. Officers on approaching defendant's car dimmed their lights,
then turned them on bright again. Defendant did the same. Officers repeated the act, and so did the defendant. The officers believing defendant
understood their act to be a signal, stopped his car and searched it.
Obviously this search was illegal.
A case similarly clear is Boyd v. State, 198 Ind. 55, 152 N. E. 278, in
which the defendant while driving a taxi was seen exchanging packages
with a negro. A search followed, which was correctly pronounced illegal.
Thus it seems that the courts have gone closer to the line in holding seizures legal than they have in declaring them illegal. On one side is the
constitutional right against unlawful search and seizure, on the other the
problem of enforcing prohibition in the face of prevalent violation. The
principal case holds that information of a future delivery of liquor plus
flight is insufficient to constitute probable cause. It is a question that has
not been directly decided in Indiana before, and obviously has its difficult
points. Probably in case of doubt the decision should be in favor of constitutional guaranties.
Assuming, however, that the evidence was illegally obtained, another
question remains. "Is the right to object to admission of such evidence
lost unless a motion to quash it has been timely made?" The Appellate
Court so held in Hantz v. State, (1929) 166 N. E. 439. A seemingly exhaustive review of the law on this point was made in the opinion, and the
"almost universal rule" was recited to be that a court will not, after actual
commencement of a trial by the introduction of evidence, entertain such
motive and thus try a collateral issue, except where the knowledge of possession of such evidence was at this time first learned by the party objecting.
The old doctrine was that "evidence is not inadmissible against the
accused in a criminal case because it was obtained by an illegal search
and seizure." 24 A. L. R. 1411. There are many cases therein cited that
support this general rule of evidence, with no reference to any right of
objection. This rule is vigorously defended by Professor Wigmore in
American Bar Association Journal, August, 1922, p. 479.
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On the other hand there are many modern cases holding that evidence
obtained by illegal search and seizure is absolutely inadmissible. 24 A. L.
R. 1417. In 1914 the Supreme Court in Weeks v. United States, 232 U. S.
383, held constitutional rights supreme when asserted before trial, and subsequent cases in that court have recognized the constitutional right as taking precedence over the above mentioned general rule of evidence although
first asserted at the trial. 24 A. L. R. 1417. This view was vigorously
assailed by Professor Wigmore in his above mentioned article, but was
supported in American Bar Association Journal, October, 1922, p. 646, by
Cannor Hall.
Thus there are actually three theories, with many cases to support each,
instead of "an almost universal rule"; one holding the evidence admissible
despite illegal search and seizure, another holding such evidence absolutely
inadmissible, and the third requiring an objection made before trial (24
A. L. R. 1421), in accord with the rule of Hantz v. State, supra.
But this last rule has been quite ingeniously ignored by the Supreme
Court of Indiana. In fact, frequently a reversal has been ordered where
the objection to the evidence was firsf made at the trial. Thompson v.
State, 198 Ind. 496; Conner v. State, 167 N. E. 545; Walker v. State, 142
N. E. 16. The second rule was apparently followed in Callender v. State,
193 Ind. 91, 138 N. E. 817, which flatly held that "property seized under an
invalid search warrant is inadmissible."
On the other hand, Hantz v. State, supra,has never been expressly overruled. In the case in question, the trial came some eleven months after
the search and arrest. Applying the rule of the Appellate Court, the right
to object clearly was lost, but the Supreme Court chose to add this case to
those that decided contra to the rule without any mention of its existence.
Martin, J., is decidedly correct in stating that the profession and the
Appellate Court are entitled to a definite settlement of the quesion by the
Supreme Court.
P. J. D.
SEDUCTION-WHAT CONsTiTUTEs.-There was evidence of D's having
sought the society of P frequently; of his protestation of love for her; of
his kindness and courtesy; of his discussing his business and personal
affairs with her; of his statement to her that he desired to get a divorce
and marry her; and of a course of conduct calculated to win P's confidence
and affection and to bring about the seduction claimed. At the time of
yielding by the P she knew that D was a married man. Held, for P, that
the knowledge that D was married does not preclude recovery, and that a
promise of marriage is not a necessary element in seduction. Burke v.
Middlesworth, Appellate Court of Indiana, January 29, 1931; 174 N. E. 432.
Seduction may create both civil and criminal liability. In Indiana any
male person is guilty of the crime of seduction who, under promise of
marriage, shall have illicit carnal intercourse with any female of good
repute for chastity, under the age of twenty-one. Burns Annotated Ind.
Stat., 1926, Sec. 2553. Since the principal case is a suit for damages the
note will be confined to the civil phase.
The word "seduction" is of Latin derivation, and signifies a leading
astray. Pertman v. State, 29 Tex. App. 454, 16 S. W. 97. It has been
defined as the act of a man in enticing a woman of previous chaste charac-

